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Anthropomorphism as Cognitive Bias
Mike Dacey
Philosophers and psychologists have long worried that a human tendency to anthropomorphize
leads us to err in our understanding of nonhuman minds. This tendency, which I call intuitive
anthropomorphism, is a heuristic used by our unconscious folk psychology to understand the
behavior of nonhuman animals. I argue that the dominant understanding of intuitive
anthropomorphism underestimates its complexity. It does often lead us to err, but not always.
And the errors it produces are not only overestimations of nonhuman intelligence. If we want to
understand and control intuitive anthropomorphism, we must treat is as a cognitive bias, and look
to the empirical evidence. The literature on controlling implicit social biases is particularly
helpful. That literature suggests that the most common for intuitive anthropomorphism,
Morgan’s Canon, should be rejected, while others need supplementation. It also suggests new
approaches.
1. Introduction
Humans naturally anthropomorphize. As David Hume put it: “There is an universal tendency
among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves . . . We find faces in the moon, armies in
the clouds” (Hume 1957, pg. 29). Philosophers and psychologists attempting to understand the
minds of nonhuman animals have long worried that this tendency leads us to error. This worry is
shared across fields and across theoretical attitudes about anthropomorphism more generally.
Kennedy (1992) argues forcefully against any form of anthropomorphism, and sees this
tendency, which is “simply built into us” (pg. 28, emphasis his), as the reason it is so
problematic. Rivas & Burghardt (2002) believe that some forms of anthropomorphism are
valuable, but caution against its naïve forms: “Anthropomorphism is like Satan in the bible - it
comes in many guises and can catch you unawares!” (pg. 15). I call the human tendency to
anthropomorphise intuitive anthropomorphism, and it is the specific target of this paper. Existing
views get intuitive anthropomorphism wrong, and as a result, fail to control its effect on the
sciences of nonhuman minds.
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To start, the term ‘anthropomorphism’ (simpliciter) needs clarification. In its strictest sense,
anthropomorphism is sometimes defined as a kind of error: overestimating the intelligence of
animals by attributing to them human-like traits they do not have (perhaps consciousness or
belief-desire psychology). A broader sense of the term applies to the belief that a nonhuman
animal possesses any of these ‘characteristically human’ traits, while allowing that that belief
may be true or false. A still broader sense treats anthropomorphism as a way of thinking, or a
process of forming beliefs about non-human minds: coming to understand the minds of
nonhuman animals by analogy to our own, while leaving open whatever beliefs we might form. I
treat anthropomorphism as a process. Though anthropomorphism-as-an-error is probably most
often made explicit, usage of the term tends to slide between these, especially in debates over the
role of anthropomorphism in science (more in section 6). I view anthropomorphism as a process
because it allows more productive engagement with the crucial problem.1 I say this for three
reasons.
Firstly, this use allows me to remain agnostic about anthropomorphism generally. There is a
large and contentious debate about whether there are legitimately scientific anthropomorphic
strategies (e.g. Burghardt 1985, Rivas & Burghardt  2002, de Waal 1991, 1999, Mitchell 2005,
Wynne 2007). I side-step this debate to focus specifically on intuitive anthropomorphism, which
is just one kind of anthropomorphism.
Secondly, it does not prematurely restrict anthropomorphism to certain posits, better
capturing the nature of intuitive anthropomorphism. Intuitive anthropomorphism is a heuristic
1 There are two other reasons I won’t argue for at length. First, treating anthropomorphism as a process is
anthropocentric in a much less pernicious way than the other definitions. They mark off a class of ‘characteristically
human’ traits, but why think we have special claim to them? But, we are human, so it is natural that we interpret
other species from our own perspective. Second, this view shows how one can be concerned about intuitive
anthropomorphism without thinking that animals are unintelligent, or that they don’t have minds. This is not what is
at issue here.
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employed by our unconscious folk psychology. Our unconscious interprets behavior of
nonhuman animals in the same way it interprets human behavior. It is an empirical question what
effects this may have. Like any cognitive heuristic, it likely leads to errors in many cases, but it
does not always do so, and we can’t know how or when it does until we’ve tested it. It is a
mistake to assume what effects it has at the outset. In fact, intuitive anthropomorphic error is not
merely a matter of overestimating intelligence by positing a set of specific mental states, so
controls that simply aim at correcting this mistake are ineffective. The effects of intuitive
anthropomorphism are complex, and the errors it produces share nothing besides their common
source. Focusing on any particular kind of posit or error before we understand intuitive
anthropomorphism dooms us from the start.
Thirdly, this way of looking at anthropomorphism opens up a new approach to debates about
it. Too often these debates proceed as follows: one theorist claims that common explanations of
some behavior (read: not their own preferred theory) are either overly anthropomorphic or overly
averse to anthropomorphism, while another claims the opposite. These are not really arguments
about anthropomorphism itself; they are arguments about those theories of animal cognition.
Very little in comparative psychology is settled, so it should not be surprising that these debates
make little headway. This approach makes sense if anthropomorphism is a kind of error: to
identify instances of anthropomorphism in the field, we must first identify errors in the field. If
anthropomorphism is a process, there is another approach available at the level of individual
psychology. So I do not argue that the field is overly anthropomorphic, I argue that any particular
judgement one makes about the psychology of nonhuman animals might be subject to the
influence of intuitive anthropomorphism. As such, any particular judgement is potentially subject
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to an intuitive anthropomorphic bias.2 To understand what this means, I look to the empirical
literature.
Intuitive anthropomorphic bias is one kind of cognitive bias that results from reasoning
heuristics applied in our unconscious (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman 1974). The literature on
cognitive biases and unconscious processing generally will help understand intuitive
anthropomorphism (section 2). The literature on implicit social biases will help understand how
to control it (section 3). This is the largest literature on controlling unconscious biases, and it
targets interventions of the right form for the current discussion. Collectively, this literature
suggests that existing strategies for controlling intuitive anthropomorphism are ineffective
(sections 4-6), and can help develop new controls (section 7).
Figure 1.
2 This might appear to imply that the field is overly anthropomorphic. But I argue that the effects of intuitive
anthropomorphism are poorly understood, so it is unclear what it means to say that the field is overly
anthropomorphic in the first place.
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2. The Intuitive Anthropomorphic Bias
Figure 1 shows Ham the Chimpanzee in 1961, on his way to the capsule that will launch him
into space. He is about to become the first hominid to orbit the earth. The look on his face
appears to be one of excitement or pride (internet comments on the photo show how common
this interpretation is). Perhaps he perceives excitement in the behavior of those around him, or
perhaps he is just pleased by the attention. Unfortunately, this is unlikely. In chimpanzees, this
expression is known as the ‘fear grin.’ As much as we can rationalize the thought that Ham is
pleased, fear is a more likely reactions to being strapped into a seat and carried to a strange
enclosure.
This is a case where intuitive anthropomorphism leads us astray. We see an animal grinning
and it looks to us like happiness. That is a pretty good heuristic for dealing with other humans,
but we go wrong because our unconscious folk psychology applies it the same way in
nonhumans. Even knowing that we are wrong, the perceptual Gestalt remains: Ham still looks
happy. Note that we are not positing human-like capacities in Ham that he incapable of having.
There is no substantive difference in the intelligence required for fear and happiness.3 Intuitive
anthropomorphism does lead us to err, and those errors do not just overestimate intelligence
(though sometimes they do). We also should not think that intuitive anthropomorphism always
leads us to error (anthropomorphism is a way of thinking, not a kind of error), but there is good
reason to think it will do so often.
Daily experience with pets and animal cartoons demonstrates how easy it is: we talk to our
dogs, and do not blink when cartoon dogs talk to their owners. There are also evolutionary
3 I am speaking loosely of ‘happiness’ and ‘fear,’ but I do not mean the human mental states; I mean whatever is the
chimpanzee analogue.
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reasons to think we should anthropomorphize: Intuitive anthropomorphism is the kind of fast and
frugal heuristic that can work for evolutionary purposes, even if it is not up to the epistemic
standards of science. As some have argued (e.g. Caporeal & Heyes 1997, Gallup, Marion &
Eddy 1997), our intuitive folk psychology most likely evolved to inform social interactions with
other humans, and then was exapted to handle interactions with nonhuman animals. The
intractable problems of interpreting other minds are a prime target for ‘good enough’ predictive
strategies (Dennet 1989 argues in a similar spirit).
There is also considerable empirical evidence that humans make errors because of intuitive
anthropomorphism. In one of the classic studies of psychology, Heider & Simmel (1944) showed
that participants attributed intentional actions to a collection of two dimensional shapes
‘interacting’ in a short cartoon. This indicates a tendency to see (quite literally) intentional action
when certain cues are present. In this experiment, the cues are irregular movements that seeming
respond to one another. This, by itself, is insufficient evidence to really conclude that behavior is
intentional, but it seems to be enough for our unconscious folk psychology.
In general, our anthropomorphic unconscious folk psychology seems to trigger on simple or
irrelevant cues, suggesting it triggers too often. Other simple cues like hands, eyes, and faces
influence the attribution of conscious mental states (e.g. Arico et. al. 2011, Fiala, Arico, &
Nichols 2011).  Magnifying this, humans are wired to err in the direction of seeing faces that
aren’t there over missing faces that are (e.g. Liu et. al. 2014). Finally, humans are biased in
attributing conscious mental states to animals that move at about the same speed as us
(Morewedge, Preston, & Wegner 2007).
Children, of course, anthropomorphise wildly (e.g. Gebhard, Nevers, & Billmann-Mahecha
2003). And adults anthropomorphize when explaining and imagining behavior. Religious
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participants asked to describe God or tell stories involving God will anthropomorphize God,
even when doing so contradicts their theological beliefs (e.g. these are anthropomorphic errors
by the subjects’ own lights; Barret & Keil 1996). Participants presented with written descriptions
of situations and asked to assess the ‘reasonableness’ of various mental state attributions ascribe
mental states to dogs that are of the same kind as they do a human child (though quantitatively
simpler; Rasmussen and Rajecki 1995).
One might wonder whether these effects apply to scientists. While scientists may not make
the flagrant errors that children make, or that experimental subjects make in snap judgments, we
should expect that they do make some errors. In general, unconscious social biases influence
behavior even during careful deliberation by experts. This has been shown in hiring decisions
(Bertrand & Mullainathan 2003), including hiring by scientists (Moss-Racusin et al. 2012),
medical decision making (Green et. al. 2007), the judicial process (Banks, Eberhardt, & Ross
2006, Mitchell et. al. 2005, Rachlinski et. al. 2009). Expertise and deliberation are not
themselves sufficient to stop cognitive biases. In fact, the self-perception that one is objective
increases social bias (Uhleman & Cohen 2007).
So scientists and philosophers should not expect themselves to be immune. In addition,
scientific practice is complex, and intuitive anthropomorphism can arise at every stage of
research: model construction, experimental design, data gathering, and model choice. At each
stage, it can arise in different ways, and bias at one stage will be compounded in later stages:
attention and recall are biased towards stereotype confirming evidence (e.g. confirmation bias
supporting implicit bias; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Darley & Gross, 1983). This, along with
the subtlety of cognitive biases generally, mean that the effects of anthropomorphic bias can be
complex and, in at least some cases, counterintuitive (recall Ham).
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Putting this all together, there is good reason to believe that intuitive anthropomorphism is
problematic in a context like comparative psychology. It is triggered by simple stimuli like eyes
and hands, and its effects can be subtle and unpredictable. Awareness of the bias, even with
deliberation and expertise, is not sufficient to control it. We cannot be sure how and to what
degree any specific judgment about animal cognition is (or is not) influenced. So what can we
do?
3. Controlling Implicit Social Bias
The literature on controlling implicit biases provides the best current evidence about
controlling cognitive biases, and some of the interventions discussed there are especially
instructive to the current discussion. So I turn to that literature now. The upshot is that taking
steps to ensure that counter-stereotypical information is salient in reasoning is more effective
than simply directing participants to avoid or ‘correct’ for bias.
The Weapon Identification Task is a common test of bias. Participants identify an image as a
tool or a weapon, but are very briefly shown an image of a white or black face before. If, for
instance, subjects mistakenly say that a tool is a weapon after a black face more often than a
white face, that is taken as a characteristic indicator of bias.
Not all interventions that make intuitive sense work. Using this task, Payne, Lambert, &
Jacoby (2002) tested the effects of instructions on bias. Participants in the two experimental
conditions were first told that research had shown that people possess implicit racial biases that
can influence performance on the task, and then told either to “avoid race” or “use race” in
making their decision. Controls were not given any of these instructions. In fact, the two
experimental groups were more likely to make errors consistent with racial bias than the control
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group. Thus, the authors conclude, calling attention to race has the effect of increasing bias,
whether participants are told to use or avoid it. The instruction itself activates racial stereotypes
that lead to biased judgments. Similarly, Legault, Gutsell, & Inzlicht (2011) showed that
motivating participants to avoid racial bias increases bias if they perceive the motivation as
coming from an external source, but can reduce bias if it is seen as self generated.
Stewart & Payne (2008) found a more effective approach. They used implementation
intentions, which are if-then action plans that make it easier for participants to accomplish a goal
than general intentions to do so. For instance, the implementation intention “if I leave work, I
will stop and exercise at the gym” is more effective than the general intention “I will exercise
more.” Stewart & Payne asked participants to form one of three implementation intentions. The
first: “whenever I see a black face on the screen, I will think the word, accurate.” The second:
“whenever I see a black face on the screen, I will think the word, quick.” The third: “Whenever I
see a black face on the screen, I will think the word, safe.” Those participants were told: “By
thinking the word ‘safe,’ you are reminding yourself on each trial that you are just as safe
interacting with a Black individual as with a White individual” (pg. 1336). Only the ‘think safe’
condition reduced bias.
Another common intervention is to show participants images of admired or counter-
stereotypical members of the stereotyped group. Dasgupta & Greenwald (2001) found this effect
using the Implicit Association Test. In one manipulation, Dasgupta & Greenwald (2001) showed
participants images of admired black individuals and disliked white individuals before giving
them the IAT. They found that doing so reduced bias, whether the images were presented
immediately before or 24 hours before administering the IAT. Govan & Williams (2004)
achieved a similar result using counter-stereotypical examples in the experiment itself, even
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using non-social stereotypes about flowers and insects. Imagining a positive, productive
interaction with members of the stereotyped group before performing an IAT can also reduce
bias (Turner & Crisp 2010).
So the most consistently effective interventions are those that make counterstereotypical
information salient in reasoning, like the ‘think safe’ intention, or imagined interactions. What
doesn’t work is demanding accuracy.  I now apply the lessons of the discussion so far to existing
methods of controlling anthropomorphism.
4. Morgan’s Canon
Perhaps the most commonly advocated method of addressing anthropomorphism is an
updated version of Morgan’s Canon, a famous statement by the 19th century comparative
psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan (1894). The modern interpretation of Morgan’s Canon councils
that researchers should adopt the model that describes the simplest psychological process that
can predict behavior. This practice is widespread, and is still motivated largely by concerns about
anthropomorphism (Graham 1998, Manning & Dawkins 1998, Shettleworth 2010, Wilder 1996,
Wynne 2007). In order to control anthropomorphism generally, it must control intuitive
anthropomorphism specifically.
de Waal (1998), Sober (2005), and Fitzpatrick (2008) have argued that Morgan’s Canon
leads to errors of ‘anthropodenial,’ the underestimation of animal intelligence (more on their
reply in section 5). My arguments so far show why: Morgan’s Canon explicitly aims to correct a
bias that consistently overestimates intelligence, but, first, intuitive anthropomorphism does not
always lead to errors, and second (think of Ham) its errors need not have anything to do with
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intelligence. So Morgan’s Canon sometimes aims to correct errors that were not made, and
sometimes aims to correct the wrong error.
My arguments also suggest another problem: even in cases where intuitive
anthropomorphism has lead someone to overestimate the intelligence of an animal, Morgan’s
Canon may not be effective. Effective interventions to control implicit bias make counter-
stereotypical information salient. Morgan’s Canon does not. It is more similar to the ineffective
interventions: it is a demand to make the ‘unbiased’ judgment, like the Stewart & Payne (2008)
‘think accurate’ condition, or the Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby (2002) ‘avoid race’ instruction. The
effect Morgan’s Canon has depends on how it is represented by the person using it. If researchers
view it as an external demand to avoid anthropomorphism, it could actually increase bias
(Legault, Gutsell, & Inzlicht 2011). Similarly, if researchers view it as being about
anthropomorphism, it could activate anthropomorphic stereotypes, and increase bias, like the
“use race” and “avoid race” instructions from Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby (2002).
So how this plays out will vary on a case by case basis. But this leaves Morgan’s Canon in a
bad position. Firstly, intuitive anthropomorphism does not always lead to error, and when it does,
it does not always overestimate intelligence. In these cases, Morgan’s Canon produces errors in
the other direction. Secondly, even in the cases in which it should be most effective, the
empirical evidence suggests that it may be ineffective or even increase bias.4 Morgan’s Canon
should not be used to control intuitive anthropomorphism.
5. Evidentialism
4 Also, as mentioned, intuitive anthropomorphism can influence any stage of research. A rule about model choice,
like Morgan’s Canon, doesn’t address anthropomorphism at other stages.
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The next control is proposed by Sober (2005) and Fitzpatrick (2008) as replacements for
Morgan’s Canon. Sober concludes his paper with the memorable line: “The only prophylactic we
need is empiricism” (2005 pg. 97). Fitzpatrick frames the claim as a principle he calls
‘evidentialism’ (2008, pg. 242). The shared idea is that one should wait until there is sufficient
evidence before adopting a hypothesis.
This, of course, is good advice. The problem is that inferences about what is sufficient
evidence are potentially subject to intuitive anthropomorphic bias. This is, arguably, exactly what
is at issue in this debate. We need guidelines that specifically address intuitive
anthropomorphism, so evidentialism alone is not enough.
6. Identifying Errors
Many authors discuss more specific instantiations of anthropomorphic error. This suggests a
third strategy. The more specific the errors we can identify, the better positioned we are to avoid
them. Simply warning against ‘anthropomorphism’ in general is too vague to be helpful.
De Waal (1999) argues against anthropocentric anthropomorphism, which is attempting to
explain behavior by simply imagining how you would approach the task. He emphasizes that
researchers need to consider the perspective of the animal itself. Thus, there is an identifiable
difference between instances of pernicious anthropocentric anthropomorphism and what he calls
animal-centric anthropomorphism. Rivas & Burghardt (2002) describe the related
anthropomorphism by omission, which assumes that the capacities of nonhuman animals are a
subset of our own. In reality, nonhuman animals have many capacities that we do not.
Lockwood (1986) distinguishes several kinds of anthropomorphism, the most interesting of
these is explanatory anthropomorphism. This is the fallacy of thinking we have explained a
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behavior simply by giving it a (folk psychological) name. Many raise related worries about the
use of folk psychological terminology, which might make it easy to unintentionally slip into
intuitive anthropomorphism. Authors worry about this to different degrees. Kennedy (1992)
argues for the complete replacement of folk psychological terminology, while de Waal (1999)
argues for the use of neutral descriptive terminology when observing and recording data, though
folk psychological can be used theoretical interpretation. Finally, Bekoff (2000) argues that
general care is all that is needed.
Povinelli lists several specific errors (2012, appendix 1), for instance, the end-point training
effect: one watching an animal perform some task can be struck by her success, and forget that
the behavior required hundreds or thousands of practice trials. Another, he calls The Erin
Moriarty effect (after a journalist who visited his lab): in tasks in which an animal has a 50/50
chance of ‘success,’ trials in which it succeeds feel more meaningful.
Whether or not these specific proposals stand up, there is a useful idea here. The problem is
that there is little reason to believe that we will be able to identify a list of discrete errors that
exhausts intuitive anthropomorphic bias. The effects of cognitive bias are subtle, complex, and
often unpredictable. And we need controls that will generalize to experiments not yet done. So,
like evidentialism, this approach is helpful, but more is needed.
7. Building New Strategies
I have argued that awareness of bias in deliberation is not an effective control itself, but it
might seem hasty to argue that it has no role. Either way, though, a proper understanding of bias
is essential. So given that the field has implicit anthropomorphism wrong, adopting the view that
I have argued for can only help. But we need more than this. Of existing controls, Morgan’s
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Canon should be eliminated, while evidentialism and identifying errors can be helpful, but are
not enough. So I suggest that we look to the literature on controlling social biases for new
strategies.
The literature on controlling implicit biases suggests an empirical hypothesis. Imagining
intelligent seeming actions performed by a being that is (relatively) unlikely to be
anthropomorphised, such as a computer, an insect, or an octopus (Eddy, Gallup, & Povinelli
1993), might reduce subsequent intuitive anthropomorphism. This is analogous to imagining
positive interactions with members of stereotyped groups. As an empirical claim, this needs to be
tested, and testing it will not likely be easy.
In the meantime, there are proposals better supported by the evidence discussed above.
Implementation intentions reduce implicit bias because they help ensure that a specific goal is
implemented at the right time (Stewart & Payne 2008). For practicing comparative
psychologists, this would be much more difficult because the goals will have to be much more
complicated. So, in place of implementation intentions, I suggest checklists. Checklists have
been helpful in many settings, including airline takeoffs, engineering, and surgery (Borchard et
al. 2012), and have been suggested as a method to reduce implicit bias in judges (Seamone
2006). Checklists can ensure that a large number of complicated intentions are enacted at the
right time.
This checklist might include two sets of items. One set should specify alternative hypotheses
that might explain the behavior. This should include hypotheses beyond that which is favored in
the field and that which is the researchers own hypothesis: Heyes (2015) argues that many well-
known effects that could explain behaviors are often ignored in specific debates in comparative
psychology (One could also produce new hypotheses by imagining how something unlikely to be
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anthropomorphised could perform the task). Another set of items could come from a more
systematic program of identifying errors, modelled on the heuristics and biases literature (e.g.
Gillovich, Griffin, & Kahneman 2002). A more complete taxonomy of intuitive anthropomorphic
errors can help in many cases, even if it is not alone sufficient. If there is an alternative
hypothesis, or there is reason to believe an error has been made, one must step back and reassess
the evidence.
These suggestions of the last section need to be tested, and perhaps better measures can be
found, but for now, these are the options best supported by the empirical evidence we have.
8. Conclusion
One might reasonably wonder what this discussion means for the current state of
comparative psychology, as I have explicitly avoided this question. This discussion does not tell
us whether the field in general overestimates the intelligence of nonhuman animals. While
overestimating intelligence is one effect of intuitive anthropomorphism, it is only one of them. It
may not even be a dominant effect; it is easily identified, so its apparent prominence may simply
be an matter of availability.
One effect that the dynamic between intuitive anthropomorphism and Morgan’s Canon
might have is to produce a stark divide between sophisticated ‘cognitive’ capacities, often
couched in folk psychological terms, and overly simplistic associative explanations. This
concern has been raised elsewhere (Penn 2011, Heyes 2015), but considerations raised here can
(partially) explain it. Not only do folk-psychological models seem more intuitively plausible,
intuitive anthropomorphism can influence the building of models. So, either models are
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constructed using the few mathematical tools we have (like associative modeling) or under the
heavy influence of folk psychology. Beyond that, I suspect there is little that can be said in
general, and progress will have to be made on a case by case basis.
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